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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).
ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court properly conclude that plaintiffs failed to file their
complaint prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, even with the
statutory tolling and additional time added into the limitations period?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 2)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 3)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 4)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment and now on appeal,
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the statute of limitations problem by dramatically altering the
claims in this case. Despite the allegations in the complaint and amended complaint and
the specific causes of action, plaintiffs now argue a different injury caused by new acts of
negligence. Contraiy to plaintiffs' arguments, this case is a straightforward application of
a two-year statute of limitations to a set of uncontested material facts. As set forth in
Point I of the argument section, the trial court properly applied the statute of limitations
and the statutory tolling provisions to the uncontested facts in order to conclude that
plaintiffs' complaint was filed four days after the statute of limitations expired.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper claim that
Sheila Harper was injured by negligent medical care and treatment rendered by
defendants, Keith H. Evans, M.D., Gary B. White, M.D., and Uintah Basin Women's
Health, on November 15, 2002, and November 16, 2002. (R. at 9-15: a copy of plaintiffs'
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amended complaint is included in the Addendum to this brief.) The allegedly negligent
conduct arises out of two surgeries and includes the following acts: (1) the placement of
two sutures around Mrs. Harper's ureter during her hysterectomy surgery on November
15, 2002; (2) the removal of one of Mrs. Harper's ovaries during surgery on November
16, 2002, which was necessary in order to remove the two allegedly negligently placed
ureteral sutures; and (3) the removal of Mrs. Harper's appendix during either the
November 15 or November 16, 2002 surgeries. (R. at 11) These two November surgeries
are the only acts of negligence alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint. (R. at 10-11)
Indeed, the only allegations of negligence are set forth in paragraphs 7-10 in the amended
complaint; no other allegations of negligence are provided. (R. at 10-11)

BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2002, Mrs. Harper presented to Dr. Evans for consultation and
the evaluation of several health issues including excessive bleeding and cramping that she
had been experiencing during her menstrual cycle. (R. at 10) On November 15, 2002, Dr.
Evans and Dr. White performed a total abdominal hysterectomy and a Marshall-Marchetti
procedure on Mrs. Haiper. (R. at 11) A Marshall-Marchetti procedure is one that
surgically reinforces the bladder neck in order to prevent urinary incontinence or
unintentional urine loss. Immediately after her surgery, Mrs. Harper experienced lower
quadrant pain radiating to her left flank. (R. at 11)
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In order to address Mrs. Harper's lower quadrant pain, an intravenous
pyelogram (IVP)1 was performed on Mrs. Harper, which revealed a blockage in her left
ureter. On November 16, 2002, Dr. Evans performed a laparotomy2 and removed two
sutures from Mrs. Harper's left ureter. (R. at l l ) 3
DOPL PROCEEDINGS
Nearly two years after Mrs. Harper's surgery, on November 4, 2004,
plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action with the Department
of Occupational and Professional Licensing (hereinafter "DOPL"), and served the same
upon Defendants. (R. at 29) On the same date, plaintiffs also served a Request for
Prelitigation Panel Review with DOPL. (R. at 29) A prelitigation hearing was held, and
on July 14, 2005, DOPL issued its Panel Opinion on plaintiffs' claims. (R. at 30)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE
On January 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint against only Dr. Evans and
Uintah Basin Women's Health, alleging a cause of action for medical malpractice,

1

An intravenous pyelogram or IVP is a procedure that involves the intravenous
injection of a radiopaque liquid into the urinary tract. This liquid is highly visible upon
observation by x-ray and allows important information about blockages in the kidneys,
bladder and ureter to be observed.
2

General term for abdominal surgery.

3

With respect to these allegations of injury and the alleged negligence of
defendants, the above recitation of facts is taken solely from plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint.
4

general negligence and lack of informed consent as to removal of Mrs. Harper's ovary
that occurred in the November 16, 2002 surgery. (R. at 1-6) On February 1, 2006,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Dr. White as a defendant and two additional
causes of action related to the appendectomy that occurred in one of the November 2002
surgeries. (R. at 9-15, 30)
During the litigation, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. (R. at 2687, 88-90) In defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants set forth 12
paragraphs of material facts to establish the relevant dates for the surgeries and plaintiffs'
knowledge of the complications from these surgeries. (R. at 28-30) In opposing
defendants' motion, plaintiffs did not dispute any of the material facts supporting
defendants' motion. (R. at 92) Furthermore, plaintiffs added additional facts indicating
that, during the November 16, 2002 surgery, Mrs. Harper was aware that her appendix
was removed, one of her ovaries was removed, and the bladder suspension performed in
the first surgery was undone. (R. at 92) Mrs. Harper admitted that, immediately following
these surgeries, she had "severe difficulty urinating and chronic pelvic pain." (R. at 92)
As discussed, plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted causes of action based on the
removal of Mrs. Harper's ovary and appendix. (R. at 9-15)

5

In opposing defendants' motion, plaintiffs did not contest defendants'
statement of facts and, instead, argued for the first time that the negligent medical
treatment occurred during Mrs. Harper's post-operative follow-up care from November
25, 2002 through April 7, 2003. (R. at 98) Despite the factual allegations and specific
causes of action tied to the two November 2002 surgeries, plaintiffs' opposition
memorandum stated that defendants did not breach the applicable standard of care in
performing either of the November 2002 surgeries. (R. at 101-02) Rather, plaintiffs
argued that defendants breached the standard of care in failing to diagnose Mrs. Harper's
bladder condition in a timely manner. (R. at 102)
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENTS
Faced with a motion for summary judgment that argued the statute of
limitations had run on their claims, plaintiffs apparently abandoned the claims they
asserted in their amended complaint and started fresh in order to avoid the statute of
limitations problem. In contrast to the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiffs
now claim that neither the November 15 or 16, 2002 surgeries was negligently performed.
(R. at 102) Instead, plaintiffs argued that any negligence on the part of defendants
occurred after the surgeries and that Mrs. Harper only discovered this alleged negligence
in April 2003 when she consulted with another doctor for continual problems she was
experiencing in voiding her bladder dating back to the now "non-negligent" November
2002 surgeries. (R. at 102) Now, plaintiffs argue that none of the defendants were the
6

cause of the injury to Mrs. Harper's bladder; rather, plaintiffs assert that defendants were
negligent in failing to properly diagnose a surgical complication, which ultimately
exacerbated the surgical complication and caused the condition to become permanent. (R.
at 101-02) As set forth in the facts above and as set forth in plaintiffs' amended
complaint in the Addendum to this brief, this new allegation is inconsistent with the facts
alleged in the amended complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs' argument is inconsistent with
Utah law on what injury is sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year statute of
limitations for medical malpractice claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred by the Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations.
The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs filed their complaint after

the two-year statute of limitation had expired. Although plaintiffs now dispute that the
November 2002 surgeries were negligent, plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint
unequivocally allege that the surgeries were allegedly negligent and that Mrs. Harper was
immediately aware of her injuries after her surgeries. Moreover, plaintiffs did not dispute
any of the material facts supporting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Once
Mrs. Harper was aware of her injuries and that the injuries were related to the allegedly
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negligently performed surgeries, plaintiff had the requisite knowledge of a legal injury
and the statute of limitations commenced.4
Although the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act establishes a two-year
statute of limitations commencing on the date plaintiff discovers a legal injury, the Act
contains many provisions which toll and/or extend the limitations period. Because
plaintiffs availed themselves of two of these provisions, the following detailed time line is
helpful to understand when the limitations period ended.
Event

Date

Effect on Statute of Limitation

1 st Surgery

Nov. 15,2002

No effect on statute

2nd Surgery

Nov. 16,2002

Mrs. Harper experiences complications
from surgery and undergoes second surgery
to correct problems arising from the first
surgery

Statute of Limitation
Starts

Nov. 17,2002

Based on Mrs. Harper's knowledge of her
injuries and their connection to the
surgeries, the two year statute of limitations
starts on her claims

Plaintiffs Serve Notice Nov. 4, 2004
of Intent
Plaintiffs Request for
Panel Review
Pre-Lit. Hearing

Nov. 4, 2004

July 7, 2005

Provides additional 120 days from the date
the Notice is served in which to file
complaint (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8)
Request tolls limitations period until 63
days after DOPL Issues Opinion (Utah
Code Ann. §78-14-12(3))
No effect on statute

4

See Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979); Duerden v. Utah Valley
Hospital. 663 F. Supp. 781, 785-786 (D. Utah 1987).
8

'

DOPL Issues Opinion

July 14, 2005

Limitations period tolled for 63 days from
this date

DOPL issues its
Certificate of
Compliance

July 18,2005

No effect on statute

Tolling ends

Sep. 15,2005

Plaintiffs have 120 days to file their
complaint (Notice of Intent provision)

Statute Expires

Jan. 13,2006

Plaintiffs file their
complaint

Jan. 17,2006

As the table above indicates, plaintiffs missed the deadline by four days.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the trial court erred in its calculations.
Plaintiffs argued to the trial court and in their brief (at p. 24-25) that the provisions under
section 78-14-8 (120 day extension) and section 78-14-12(3)(a) (tolling plus 63 days) are
added to the remaining days of the limitations period after the notice of intent is filed and
then the total number of days starts to run after DOPL issues its opinion. This argument
is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and the application of the statute by
the Utah Supreme Court.
Section 78-14-8 provides that if the Notice of Intent is served less than 90
days before the expiration of the statute of limitation then the time for commencing the
action "shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice."5 Plaintiffs

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (emphasis added).
9

however, ignore the final words of the statutory provision and combine the 120 days with
the remaining days at end of the limitations period. Accordingly, plaintiffs' argument is
contrary to the plain language of the statute, which provides that plaintiff receives an
extension of only 120 days from the date of service of the notice.
By the express terms of the statute, the 120 days is extended from the date
of service of the notice.6 In this case, the notice was filed and served on November 4,
2004. Nothing in the statute provides that the 120 days runs from November 17, 2004, as
plaintiffs argue or is combined with those extra days when the limitations period is tolled.
In Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital, the Utah Supreme Court calculated the limitations period
by applying the 120 days from the date the notice was served, not the end of the
limitations period.7 According to plaintiffs, the Court in Forbes should have added the
120 days to end of the limitations period, which ended on November 27, 1984. Instead,
the Court correctly applied the statutory provision as running from the date the notice was
served.8
Thus, plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to an additional 13 days
(the difference between November 4 and November 17 when the limitations period

6

See id.

7

See Forbes, 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988) (adding 120 days from November
20, 1984 to extend limitations period to March 20, 1985).
8

See id.
10

ended) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and is inconsistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's application of the statute. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to the
13 days between the date when they filed their notice and the expiration of the two-year
limitations period, their argument that the statute of limitations ran on January 26, 2006 is
off by 13 days. When the statutory provisions are properly applied, the trial court
correctly determined the statute of limitations expired on January 13, 2007 - four days
before plaintiffs filed their complaint.
II.

Plaintiffs Knew of the Injuries and Negligence and Failed to Timely
File Their Action.
In this case, plaintiffs knew and specifically alleged causes of action based

on negligence that occurred in the November surgeries. Plaintiffs alleged a lack of
informed consent as to these surgical procedures. In addition, plaintiffs alleged a general
negligence claim which, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, also related
only to the November surgeries. Having missed the statute of limitations, plaintiffs now
assert that the November surgeries were not negligently performed, but rather the doctors'
negligence occurred in the post-operative care. Plaintiffs' new allegation is fatally
deficient on three points: (A) plaintiffs knew of the alleged negligence in the November
surgery and alleged actual injuries resulting from the November surgeries; (B) plaintiffs
are improperly attempting to split their claims in contravention of Utah's one-action rule;
and (C) plaintiffs' pleadings fail to allege a failure to diagnose claim.

11

The fact that plaintiff may not have been aware of the full extent of her
bladder injury until April 2003 does not toll the statute of limitations when plaintiffs were
aware of some actual injury and that the presently existing injury was related to the *
November surgery.9 Furthermore, the fact that plaintiffs believed the symptoms were
temporary and only later learned that the condition was permanent is not a sufficient to
delay the running of the statute of limitations.
A.

Plaintiffs Alleged Actual Injury Related to Surgical Procedures.
Plaintiffs satisfied the legal injury test set forth in Foil because they claimed

actual injury that stemmed from the two surgical procedures which they asserted were
negligently performed. To the extent they now claim a permanent bladder injury, the fact
remains that this injury arose from the surgical procedures and manifested itself
immediately after the surgeries. It is undisputed that Mrs. Harper underwent surgical
procedures, some of which related to her bladder. It is also undisputed that the injuries to
her bladder manifested themselves immediately after the first surgery and further
complications were apparent immediately after the second surgery. In their brief and at
summary judgment, plaintiffs have never contested that Mrs. Harper knew of the
symptoms related to her bladder condition immediately after both surgeries and that these
injuries were related to possible negligence with respect to the manner in which the

9

See, e.g., Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (once some harm
is manifest, the statute of limitations begins to run); Duerden, 663 F. Supp at 785-86.
12

surgeries were performed, including the need to remove the two sutures which
necessitated the second surgery.10
In addition to the bladder injury, plaintiffs also alleged injury for lack of
infomied consent as to two of the surgical procedures. It is undisputed that plaintiffs
were aware of both of these surgical procedures immediately after the surgeries. The lack
of infomied consent is not continuing in nature. As set forth in plaintiffs* complaint and
amended complaint, each act of alleged negligence was tied to the November surgical
procedures.
Applying the Foil test, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiffs
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware of her actual injuries and the
relationship to negligence.11 In Medved, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the rule with
respect to when a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers immediate actual
injuries and also unknown possible future injuries. The Utah Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff must assert a claim for the unknown future injuries when those injuries are
accompanied by immediate actual injuries.12 Like Medved. plaintiffs, in this case, alleged

10

See R. at 28-30, 92; see also Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 14, wherein they allege a
breach of the standard of care starting in November, 2002 and continuing through April,
2003.
11

See Medved v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77. ^[17. 125 P.3d 913.

12

See Medved, 2005 UT 77 at ^[14 (plaintiff cause of action accrued where failure
to diagnose cancer caused immediate injury and also potential for cancer to recur).
13

immediate actual injuries, in the form of the un-consented to surgical procedures, and also
the complications from the surgeries. Plaintiffs now allege the complications resulted in
future harm in the form of a permanent bladder injury; however, "once some harm is
manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims, present and future/'13
A federal district court applied the Foil test to a similar set of facts and
concluded the plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations.14 In Duerden,
the plaintiff was improperly catheterized after giving birth to her second child. Because
of the improper catheter placement, the plaintiffs bladder became distended and she had
difficulty voiding her bladder.15 During follow up care, however, the plaintiffs doctors
informed her that her problems were temporary and that her bladder would return to
normal.16 Her condition, however, did not improve and she continued to have difficulty
urinating. Eventually, a subsequent doctor diagnosed her as having a permanent and
untreatable bladder injury. The plaintiff commenced litigation for medical malpractice
over three years after the negligent placement of the catheter.17

13

Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).

14

See Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital 663 F. Supp. 781 (D. Utah 1987).

15

See id. at 782.

16

See id.

17

See id.
14

Because the plaintiff was told that the catheter was negligently placed
immediately after it happened, the district court determined the second prong of Foil knowledge of negligence - was satisfied. Thus, the district court focused on the first
prong of the Foil test. Like plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Duerden claimed her
injury was for the permanent bladder condition, which she only learned of well after the
negligent act. Relying on Reiser v. Lohner,18 the district court in Duerden discussed when
the plaintiff discovers an injury under the first prong of Foil: "the statute begins to run
upon acquisition of such knowledge, whether or not the injured party is aware of the
extent of her injury, the actual malady suffered, or the permanent nature of her
symptoms."19 The district court concluded that plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of her
injury at the time of the negligent act, at which point the plaintiff believed her symptoms
were only temporary, and the statute of limitations began to run at that point with respect
to all injuries the plaintiff may have sustained from the negligent act.20
This case is factually similar to Duerden and the federal district court's
analysis and reliance on Reiser is applicable to the claims at bar. Under Duerden, once

18

641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Rogers,
763P.2d771 (Utah 1988).
19

I d at 784.

20

See id. at 785-86; see also Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980)
(plaintiff was aware of complications from injection during dental procedure which were
sufficient to trigger statute of limitations).
15

Mrs. Harper is aware of some harm, regardless of whether she believes it is temporary or
permanent, the limitations period commences. Here, plaintiffs advance the same
arguments as in Duerden, i.e., the limitations period does not start until the injury
becomes permanent. Plaintiffs' argument, however, was rejected in both Duerden and
Reiser. Because plaintiffs have not contested the knowledge of some injury and the
relation of the injury to possible negligence, the limitations period commenced when
plaintiffs first became aware of the injury. Thus, the trial court properly concluded the
limitations period started on November 17, 2002.
R

Because Plaintiffs Alleged Actual Injuries Arising Out of the November
Surgeries, Plaintiffs Cannot Split These Claims from a Subsequent and
Related Claim In Order to Avoid the Statute of Limitations.
The gravaman of plaintiffs' argument on appeal is that surgical procedures

were non-negligent, and the negligence giving rise to her claims did not occur until
defendants failed to diagnose the bladder retention problem. Plaintiffs' new theory is
belied by the facts and the allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint. Plaintiffs
asserted two causes of action for lack of informed consent. Plaintiffs now realize these
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, have apparently withdrawn these claims,
and have now asserted new causes of action.21

21

See, e.g., Collins v. Wilson. 1999 UT 56, ^9, 984 P.2d 960 (discussing that
plaintiff changed theory of case to eliminate lack of informed consent claims and to
pursue only claims related to allegedly negligently performed post-operative care).
16

Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs had a viable claim for the failure to
diagnose the post-operative bladder condition, Utah's one-action rule precludes plaintiffs
from splitting this cause of action from the other causes of action.22 Furthermore, Utah's
appellate courts have consistently found that a plaintiffs cause of action commences once
a plaintiff has knowledge of an actual injury and any future injuries, including injuries
which are remote and only possible, must be asserted at the same time as the actual
injuries. Under the one-action rule, the limitations period on all of a plaintiff s causes of
action starts when a plaintiff first learns of an actual injury and its relation to possible
negligence, regardless of whether future harm is possible.
As applied in Medved, the Foil test also looks to Utah's adoption of the
"one-action rule."23 Under the one action rule, "once a plaintiff suffers actionable injury
[i.e. the lack of informed consent and/or complications from the surgeries], she is entitled
to recover damages not only for harm already suffered, but also for that which will
probably result in the future."24 Furthermore, "a plaintiffs failure to seek future damages
in such a situation may very well preclude any subsequent attempts at recovery."25

22

See Medved, 2005 UT 77 a t f ! 4 ,

23

See Medved. 2005 UT 77 at ^ 14.

24

Id.

25

Id.
17

Mrs. Harper underwent a surgical procedure on November 15, 2002, which
included the Marshall-Marchetti procedure on her bladder. It is undisputed that she had
complications of which she was acutely aware immediately after the first surgery.26 A test
revealed a blockage of her ureter. Mrs. Harper underwent a second surgery on November
16, 2002 to remove two sutures in her ureter from the first surgery. It is undisputed that
she was aware of the second surgery, why it was needed, and what transpired during this
second surgery, i.e. the removal of the sutures in her ureter. After this second surgery,
however, she continued to have problems voiding her bladder. It is undisputed that she
was aware of this complication and its relationship to the prior surgeries, which she
alleged to be negligent in her complaint.
In Collins v. Wilson, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that facts similar
to the allegations above, i.e., a plaintiffs awareness of complications after surgery, are
sufficient to trigger the limitations period, stating: "There is evidence that [plaintiff] has
the requisite 'awareness of physical injury' almost immediately following the initial
surgery."27 Based on her awareness of her actual injuries and the relationship of the

26

R. at 92, wherein plaintiffs state: "During the days and weeks following the two
operations, Mrs. Harper has severe difficulty urinating and chronic pelvic pain."
27

Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, f 18, 984 P.2d 960 (determining that plaintiffs
awareness of complications after surgery and that fact that medical problems were
contrary to his expectations were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice of legal injury).
18

injuries to the surgery, plaintiffs had the requisite knowledge of the legal injury with
respect to the bladder injury.
In addition to the symptoms related to her bladder injury, plaintiffs also
alleged a lack of informed consent as to both surgeries. It is undisputed that plaintiffs
were aware of the removal of the appendix and her ovary immediately after the surgery.2
Through their lack of informed consent cause of action, plaintiffs alleged the requisite
knowledge of harm and identifiable actual injury. As such, the statute of limitations on
the lack of informed consent claim also began to run immediately after the second
November surgery.
Plaintiffs are now trying to divorce themselves from their original claims
which they recognize are hopelessly time barred. In other words, plaintiffs realize the
lack of informed consent claims cannot be saved; however, plaintiffs, by changing their
allegations, are trying to preserve their claims with respect to the bladder injury. Under
Seale and Medved, however, Utah's one-action rule precludes a plaintiff from splitting
these claims. Moreover, because Mrs. Harper was aware of some harm to her bladder,
Seale and Medved require plaintiffs to assert this claim in conjunction with the lack of
informed consent claims. In Seale and Medved, the possibility of future harm was more
remote and speculative. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court required the possible

28

R. at 92.
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future injury to be asserted with the actionable existing injury. In this case, plaintiffs
cannot save the bladder claim by abandoning the lack of informed consent claims and
altering the alleged negligence acts. The trial court properly saw through plaintiffs'
recharacterization of their claims and alleged acts of negligence and determined the
claims were asserted after the limitations period had expired on the claims.
C.

Plaintiffs Failed to Allege Any Subsequent Negligent Acts in the
Amended Complaint.
This Court should not allow plaintiffs to change their allegations in

midstream in order to avoid the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' amended complaint
alleged negligence tied to the two surgical procedures. It provided no other allegation
that would put a party on notice of additional claims.
Plaintiffs' new claim is a failure to diagnose the cause of her inability to
completely void her bladder. Plaintiffs now claim neither of the surgeries was negligently
performed; however, the amended complaint indicates otherwise. Plaintiffs amended the
complaint to add the other surgeon, Dr. White, who was involved with the surgical
procedures but was not involved in any of Mrs. Harper's post-operative care. A review of
the allegations of the amended complaint indicates that each of plaintiffs' causes of action
is tied to the two November surgeries, including the allegations that Dr. Evans and Dr.
White failed to obtain informed consent for two of the surgical procedures that were
performed. No allegation of a failure to diagnose is alleged. Furthermore, if the
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allegations related only to post-operative care, Dr. White would not have needed to be
added as a defendant in the action.
In adopting the discovery rule in Foil, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
the need for a rule that allowed a plaintiff ample time to discover the nature and source of
an injury while balancing the legislature's intent to not allow stale claims to be asserted
against healthcare providers. The Utah Supreme Court stated: "the law ought not to be
construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the
existence of that right."29 Such concerns are not present in this case. It is undisputed that
plaintiffs were immediately aware of the problems with the first surgery and the need for
a second surgery to remove sutures in her ureter. Furthermore, it undisputed that
plaintiffs were immediately aware of the complications she suffered immediately after the
second surgery. Indeed, plaintiffs filed their Notice of Intent within the two-year
statutory period and received an additional 6 months in which to file the complaint.
The trial court summarized it best, stating: "Why do you guys that sue
medical defendants screw around with the tail end of these statutes? Why do you wait till
the seventh day before it runs?"30 In granting defendants' motion, the trial court got it
right: "The legislature's enacted this, I guess to insulate the doctors from extended periods
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Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979).
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(R. at 165, p. 18)
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of liability and malpractice insurance, and the policy is their business. But the law is the
law and you have two years plus these exceptions. And I think the way I've understood
this, I'm going to grant the defendants' motion; the case will be dismissed."31 This Court
should affirm the trial court's correct application of two-year statute of limitations to the
facts of this case.
III.

The Continuing Negligence Rule Has No Application to the Facts of
This Case.
Under plaintiffs' revised allegations, plaintiffs alleged that the November

2002 surgeries were properly performed, but Dr. Evans failed to diagnose Ms. Harper's
bladder condition from November 2002 until April 2003. Assuming plaintiffs had a
viable cause of action for Dr. Evans' failure to diagnose and treat the bladder condition,
this case is no different from other cases of failure to diagnose. As such, the Foil test
would govern the case. Plaintiffs argue that Peteler v. Robison should govern this case
and the continuing negligence rule applies to the case. In Peteler,32 Utah did adopt a
negligent course of treatment rule. The negligent course of treatment is different from a
continuing negligence rule.33 Utah has not adopted a continuing negligence rule.

31

(R. at 165, p. 19)
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81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932).

33

See Collins, 1999 UT 56 at t i l n.9.
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Furthermore, the facts and circumstances of Peteler do not warrant its
application to this case. In Peteler, the Utah Supreme Court's rule was driven largely by
defendant's concealment of his own negligence. Furthermore, the defendant committed a
series of negligent acts, rather than omissions, e ^ failing to diagnose, which warranted
extending the limitations period to cover each negligent act. Finally, in contrast to this
case, the series of negligent acts were related to treating the same condition and thus
established a negligent course of treatment. The case at bar is more like Collins v.
Wilson, which the Utah Supreme Court distinguished from Peteler.34 In this case,
plaintiff now asserts the initial surgeries were non-negligent, and it was only the failure to
properly diagnose the bladder retention that was negligent. Plaintiff cannot have it both
ways. Either the surgeries were negligent and then a negligent course of treatment
existed, or the surgeries were not negligent and no course of treatment exists.
Although Utah has not adopted the continuous treatment rule, the Utah
Supreme Court has noted that discovery as set forth in Foil is applicable where the
plaintiff learns of the legal injury during treatment.35 In other words, because plaintiffs
alleged both lack of informed consent and knowledge of the bladder symptoms during the
continuing treatment, the discovery rule governs rather than the last day of treatment. In
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See Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, | 1 0 . 984 P.2d 960.
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See id.
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this case, as set forth in points I & II, supra, plaintiffs possessed all of the requisite
knowledge of the injuries on November 17, 2002. Moreover, like Collins, this Court need
not decide whether Utah should adopt a continuing negligence rule in this case. The Utah
Supreme Court's analysis in Collins is applicable to this case, and plaintiffs have failed to
indicate why this Court should abandon the long line of cases following the Foil test.
Under Collins and applying the Foil test, plaintiffs possessed the requisite knowledge of a
legal injury during the allegedly negligent course of treatment. As such, the limitations
period commenced before the end of allegedly negligent course of treatment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, this Court should affirm the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The undisputed facts demonstrate
that plaintiffs' claims are time barred.
DATED this

\°

day of April, 2007.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

ROBERT G. WRIGHT / /
BRANDON B. HOBBS/ /
ZACHARY E. P E T E R ^ N
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this j~7 day of April, 2007, to the following:
Cory B. Mattson
Cory B. Mattson, LC
9677 South 700 East, #D
Sandy, UT 84070
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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ADDENDUM
(Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. at 9-15))

FILED
^
DISTR.'CT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

FEB 01 : J ; S
EE, CLERK
DEPUTY

Cory B Mattson (#9292)
Cory B Mattson, LC
9677 South 700 East, #D
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone (801) 495-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiff
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

SHEILA HARPER, and CLAYTON HARPER,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND

v.

KEITH H. EVANS, M.D., GARY B. WHITE,
M.D., and UINTAH BASIN WOMEN'S
HEALTH,

Judge John R. Anderson
Civil No. 060800008

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper complain and allege for cause of action against
Defendants Keith H. Evans, M.D. and Uintah Basin Women's Health as follows:
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES
1. The acts upon which this Complaint is based occurred entirely or substantially in
Duchesne County, State of Utah.
2. The amount claimed in this case exceeds $20,000, exclusive of costs.

3. Plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper are individuals who reside in Duchesne
County, State of Utah. Sheila Harper and Clayton Harper are lawfully married as wife and
husband.
4. Defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. is a health care provider who provided
treatment to Sheila Harper during all times alleged herein in Duchesne County, State of Utah.
5. Defendant Uintah Basin Women's Health is believed to be a clinic which employs
defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. and which is located in Roosevelt, Duchesne County, State of
Utah. At all times mentioned herein, defendant Keith Evans, M.D. is believed to have been an
employee and/or agent of Uintah Basin Women's Health.
6. Plaintiffs have complied with Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1979) and served upon
the defendant health care providers a Notice of Intent to Commence a Negligence Action.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 to 14, this matter was brought before a pre-litigation
panel of the Department of Commerce, Division for Occupational and Professional Licensing,
which issued a Certificate of Compliance on July 18, 2005.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7. In the Fall of 2002, Sheila Harper consulted Dr. Evans about excessive bleeding
and cramping during her menstrual cycle. He examined her and recommended that she undergo a
total abdominal hysterectomy. He also recommended that she undergo a Marshall-Marchetti
procedure on her bladder after he inquired about her urinary function. During her consultations
with Dr. Evans, Sheila Harper told him that she wanted to keep her ovaries and that he should
not surgically remove her ovaries. Dr. Evans told her that he would not remove her ovaries.
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8. On or about November 15, 2002, Sheila Harper underwent a total abdominal
hysterectomy, and Marshall-Marchetti procedure performed at Uintah Basin Medical Center by
Dr. Keith Evans and Dr. Gary White. Following the surgery, Sheila Harper suffered from left
lower quadrant pain radiating to her left flank. An intravenous pyelogram (IVP) revealed a
blockage of the left ureter and hydronephrosis on the left side.
9.

On November 16, 2002, Sheila Harper was taken back into surgery by Dr.

Evans. He performed a laparotomy during which he discovered that there were two sutures
around the ureter. The sutures were removed and a renal stent was placed. Dr. Evans also
performed an oopherectomy — removing Sheila Harper's ovaries.
10. Since the second surgery, Sheila has continued to have significant problems
including, inter alia, difficulty voiding her bladder, requiring self-catheterization, and pain. She
has undergone subsequent surgery to retrieve an ovarian remnant and to remove scar tissue from
the initial hysterectomy.
11. Defendants were negligent such that they failed to observe the applicable
standard of care in their treatment of Sheila Harper. Defendants' breach of the standard of care
was the proximate cause of her damages.
12. Due to Defendants' negligence, Sheila and Clayton Harper have suffered the
following damages:
a. Medical Bills: Sheila Harper has incurred past, present, and future
medical expenses as a result of Defendants' negligence;
b. Lost Wages and Earning Capacity: Sheila Harper has suffered lost
3

income, earning capacity, and household services.
c. Permanent Physical Disfigurement and Deformity: Sheila Harper has
suffered permanent physical disfigurement and deformity as a result of defendants' negligence.
d.

Physical mental, and emotional impairment:

Sheila Harper has

suffered physical, mental, and emotional impairment and disability caused by defendants'
negligence.
e. General Damages: Sheila Harper has suffered extreme pain, discomfort,
and loss of enjoyment of life as a result of the Defendant's negligence.
f. Loss of Consortium: Plaintiff Clayton Harper has suffered a loss of
consortium with his wife and companion, Sheila Harper.
13.

At all times mentioned herein, defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. was an

employee or agent of defendant Uintah Basin Women's Health acting within the course and
scope of his employment or agency. As such, Uintah Basin Women's Health is responsible for
his negligent acts via respondeat superior liability.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
- Defendants' Negligence 14. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action.
15. Defendants had a duty to observe the applicable standard of care in their
treatment of Sheila Harper. The Defendants breached the standard of care in multiple respects
which caused serious and permanent injury to the Plaintiffs as detailed above.
16. Defendants' negligence by their failure to observe the standard of care was the
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proximate cause of the damages and injuries to the Plaintiffs as alleged above.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
- Failure to Obtain Informed Consent: Oopherectomy 17. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action.
18. Defendants had a duty to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent for the
surgical removal of her ovaries. Defendants failed to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent and
then performed an oopherectomy to remove her ovaries, contrary to her express directions given
prior to the procedure.
19.

Defendants' failure to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent was the

proximate cause of her damages as alleged above.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
- Failure to Obtain Informed Consent: Appendectomy 20. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action.
21. Defendants had a duty to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent for the
surgical removal of her appendix. Defendants failed to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent
and then performed an appendectomy without her prior consent.
22.

Defendants' failure to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent was the

proximate cause of her damages as alleged above.
\\
\\

1
J

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
- Battery: Appendectomy 23. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action.
24. Defendants intentionally committed an offensive and harmful touching of Sheila
Harper's person by performing an appendectomy without her prior consent and without
informing her that they intended to perform such surgical procedure.
25. Defendants' intentional, harmful, and offensive touching caused Sheil Harper
damages as alleged above.
JURY DEMAND
25. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of all issues in this case.

DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. For an award of general damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
2. For past and future medical and incidental expenses, in an amount to be
proven at trial.
3. For other economic and out-of-pocket damages, in an amount to be proven
at trial.
4. For costs of court.
5. For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the verdict of the
jury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1991), as amended.
6

6. For such other relief as the Court deems just in the premises.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2006.

Plaintiffs Address:
657 William Remington Dr.
Duchesne, UT 84021
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